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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following her conviction for grand theft, the district court ordered Denise Frances
Nesbitt to pay restitution pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-5304 in the amount of $7,747.80.
Ms. Nesbitt contends the district court erred as a matter of law in awarding restitution for
items which were not within the scope of the offense for which she was convicted and
for which she did not agree to pay restitution as part of her plea agreement. She also
contends the district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the
restitution award because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence regarding
either the market value or the replacement cost of the items she allegedly took from the
victim.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
From January to October 2014, Ms. Nesbitt worked as an in-home caregiver at
the Buck residence, taking care of 78-year-old Gloria Buck’s disabled adult daughter,
Holly. (R., pp.63, 92; Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”), p.9.) Ms. Gloria Buck
(“Ms. Buck”) discovered that several items of jewelry were missing from her residence
and contacted the police department to report the theft.

(PSI, p.8.)

Ms. Nesbitt

admitted to accepting some jewelry from Ms. Buck’s daughter—specifically, a ring and a
feather pin—and selling that jewelry to a jewelry store for approximately $200. (PSI,
pp.3-4) She also admitted to pawning some other items of jewelry that she received
from Ms. Buck’s daughter to a pawn shop for approximately $700, of which she kept
$50 and gave the remainder to Ms. Buck’s daughter. (PSI, p.4.) She denied any
wrongdoing. (R., pp.11-12; PSI, p.4.)
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Ms. Nesbitt was charged by Information with one count of grand theft.
(R., pp.37-38.) The State alleged that Ms. Nesbitt wrongfully took jewelry valued in
excess of $1,000 from Ms. Buck. (R., pp.37-38.) The State did not identify the specific
items of jewelry that Ms. Nesbitt allegedly took from Ms. Buck.

(R., pp.37-38.)

Ms. Nesbitt entered into an agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to
plead guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), and to pay
restitution. (9/16/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.13-17; R., pp.39, 41.) In exchange, the State agreed
to recommend a withheld judgment and agreed not to file any additional charges
against Ms. Nesbitt. (R., pp.39, 41.) The district court accepted Ms. Nesbitt’s guilty
plea at the arraignment. (9/16/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.13-15; R., p.39.) Prior to accepting
Ms. Nesbitt’s guilty plea, the district court asked Ms. Nesbitt if she understood that if she
pled guilty, she may be required to pay restitution, and Ms. Nesbitt answered, “Yes.”
(9/16/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-7.) At the time, the parties had not agreed on an amount of
restitution. (9/16/15 Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.8.)
Prior to sentencing, the State filed a memorandum of restitution seeking
restitution in the amount of $2,500 to Ms. Buck and in an amount to be determined to
American Family Insurance, to compensate Ms. Buck for the loss of 13 specifically
identified items of jewelry.1 (R., pp.46-50.) The attachment to the State’s memorandum
reflects that Ms. Buck was claiming a loss of $11,415 from her insurance carrier and
had a $2,500 deductable. (R., p.50.) Ms. Nesbitt filed an objection. (R., pp.51-52.)
The State then filed an amended memorandum of restitution, seeking restitution in the

Ms. Buck included on the list of items stolen by Ms. Nesbitt a Kindle e-book reader
with lighted leather case, which she valued at $239. (R., p.72.) The district court did
not order Ms. Nesbitt to pay restitution for this item. (R., p.96.)
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amount of $8,818 to Ms. Buck and in the amount of $2,597 to American Family
Insurance. (R., pp.53-58, 68-73.) The comments indicate that the amount the State
sought to be paid to Ms. Buck included the deductible ($2,500) plus the difference
between the insurance claim Ms. Buck made ($11,415) and the amount American
Family Insurance paid ($2,597). (R., p.53.) The State included as an attachment an
explanation of remittance from American Family Insurance which reflects that it made
payment to Ms. Buck for “theft” in the amount of $97.28 and for “jewelry, watches, furs”
in the amount of $2,500. (R., p.58.) Ms. Nesbitt’s counsel orally objected to the State’s
amended memorandum of restitution at sentencing. (10/29/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-12.)
A presentence investigation report was prepared in advance of sentencing, but it
did not include an amount of loss. (PSI, p.3.) The presentence investigator stated that
his “attempts to contact the victim met with negative results.” (PSI, p.3.) At sentencing,
counsel for Ms. Nesbitt explained to the district court that Ms. Buck “indicated to me that
she knows by pleading guilty she’ll be on the hook for some restitution, and that’s the
restitution that we believe the pawned items would be for that can show a direct link to
my client.” (10/29/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-17.) Counsel for Ms. Buck asked the district court
to “take into consideration” that Ms. Nesbitt “is willing to pay for restitution for the items
she did pawn for Holly Buck, thinking they were Holly’s items and not Gloria’s. She
understands that that’s an issue, and she’s willing to pay for that.” (10/29/15 Tr., p.23,
Ls.16-20.) As stated earlier, the PSI reflects that Ms. Nesbitt received $700 from the
pawn shop for the items of jewelry that she pawned for Ms. Buck’s daughter. (PSI, p.4.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Nesbitt to a unified term of five years, with two
years fixed, and then suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Nesbitt on supervised
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probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.66-67.) In explaining its sentence, the
district court stated, “And I don’t care whether it was three items of jewelry or 30 items
of jewelry or $2,000 worth of jewelry or $8,000 worth of jewelry. The idea is that you
were employed in a position of trust.” (10/29/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.17-20.) The district court
further explained:
The Court will direct also that you make restitution to [Ms.] Buck in this
matter in an amount to be determined at a later date . . . . That amount
will be left to determine and I know there’s some issues that are going to
be sorted out, because I know [Ms.] Buck received some money from the
insurance company, but not what she feels entitled to, and there are some
issues that will have to be discussed and hammered out on that issue . . . .
(10/29/15 Tr., p.32, L.14 – p.33, L.7.) The judgment was entered on October 30, 2015.
(R., pp.75-79.)
At the restitution hearing, the State called one witness, Ms. Buck, who testified
about the items of jewelry she identified as missing and her estimation of their value.
(See 11/13/15 Tr., pp.5-68.) The State also introduced nine exhibits supporting its
restitution claim. (Exs., pp.1-9.) Following the hearing, on November 19, 2015, the
district court entered a memorandum decision and order ordering Ms. Nesbitt to pay
restitution to Ms. Buck in the amount of $5,150.52, and to American Family Insurance in
the amount of $2,597.28. (R., pp.92-101.) The district court acknowledged “there was
scant evidence presented . . . regarding the current market value of the items taken
from the victim” and there was “limited discussion of replacement value.” (R., p.95.)
The district court nonetheless concluded that the State met its burden of proving value
by a preponderance of the evidence. (R., p.97.) Ms. Nesbitt filed a timely notice of
appeal from the restitution order on December 30, 2015. (R., pp.102-06.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in awarding restitution for items which were not within the
scope of the offense for which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and for which she did
not agree to pay restitution?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in determining the amount of
restitution?
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ARGUMENT
Ms. Nesbitt does not contest that she should pay some restitution; she only
contests the scope of the restitution award (i.e., the number of items for which she is
required to pay restitution) and the amount of the restitution award (i.e. the value of the
items for which she is required to pay restitution).

The decision whether to order

restitution is within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will overturn an order
of restitution only if there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622,
623 (Ct. App. 2004). “In reviewing the trial court’s exercise of discretion, this Court must
determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the
exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citation omitted).
In challenging the scope of the district court’s restitution award, Ms. Nesbitt
challenges the district court’s interpretation of a statute—specifically, Idaho Code §195304—which presents a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
See id. at 623-24. “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory
construction.” Id. at 624. In challenging the amount of the restitution award, Ms. Nesbitt
challenges a factual finding of the district court, which this Court will not disturb unless it
is not supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 692, 169
P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007).
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I.
The District Court Erred In Awarding Restitution For Items Which Were Not
Within The Scope Of The Offense For Which Ms. Nesbitt Was Convicted And For
Which She Did Not Agree To Pay Restitution
Ms. Nesbitt was convicted of grand theft after admitting she pawned several
items of Ms. Buck’s jewelry. Ms. Nesbitt understood she would be required to pay
restitution for the items she pawned, for which she received approximately $700.2 The
district court recognized in its order awarding restitution that “there was a dispute
regarding the value assigned to the items and to the items themselves” but did not
resolve the dispute because there was “no dispute that [Ms. Nesbitt] entered a guilty
plea to the charge of grand theft” and “no dispute that a number of the . . . items were
found in local pawn shops having been brought in by [Ms. Nesbitt].” (R., p.97.) The
district court erred in awarding restitution for items of jewelry which Ms. Nesbitt did not
admit to pawning.

These items were beyond the scope of the offense for which

Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and she did not agree to pay restitution for these items as
part of her plea agreement.

The restitution award should be limited to the items

Ms. Nesbitt admitted to pawning.
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) provides in pertinent part that “[u]nless the court
determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall
order a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the

Ms. Nesbitt admitted to accepting a few items of jewelry from Ms. Buck’s daughter as
extra compensation for her services. (PSI, pp.3-4.) She received approximately $200
for these items. (PSI, pp.3-4.) Ms. Nesbitt also admitted to accepting a few items of
jewelry from Ms. Buck’s daughter which were not meant to compensate her for her
services, and which she pawned for approximately $700. (PSI, p.4.) Counsel for
Ms. Nesbitt explained at Ms. Nesbitt’s sentencing that Ms. Nesbitt understood she
would be required to pay restitution for these latter items.

2
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victim to make restitution to the victim.” With the consent of the parties, the court “may .
. . order restitution . . . for economic loss . . . for crimes which are not adjudicated or are
not before the court.” I.C. § 19-5304(9). The language of the statute makes clear that
“there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is
convicted and the damages the victim suffers.” State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886
(Ct. App. 2008). “Absent an agreement to the contrary, restitution may be ordered for
an economic loss . . . only if there is a causal connection between the conduct for which
the defendant was convicted and the loss suffered by the victim.” State v. Nienburg,
153 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted).
Here, the State failed to establish a causal connection between the conduct for
which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and any damages suffered by Ms. Buck resulting from
the loss of items other than those Ms. Nesbitt admitted to pawning for Ms. Buck’s
daughter. The Information did not identify the particular items of jewelry that Ms. Nesbitt
allegedly stole from Ms. Buck. Ms. Nesbitt admitted to taking a few items of jewelry
from the Buck residence.

This was the factual basis for her guilty plea.

(9/16/15

Tr., p.16, Ls.5-12.) The district court awarded restitution for these items, and several
additional items.

The district court erred because the State did not prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Nesbitt was responsible for any economic loss
that Ms. Buck suffered beyond the loss of the items Ms. Nesbitt admitted to pawning for
Ms. Buck’s daughter. This was the State’s burden, see State v. Reale, 158 Idaho 20,
25 (Ct. App. 2014), and the State did not meet it.
In State v. Nienburg, the Court of Appeals explained that “when a defendant has
been charged with multiple crimes and pleads guilty to part of the charges in exchange
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for dismissal of the remainder, restitution is not ordinarily awardable for loss or injury
actually and proximately caused only by the offenses for which the charges were
dismissed.” 153 Idaho at 495 (citations omitted). Applying this same reasoning here,
Ms. Nesbitt cannot be ordered pay restitution for items of jewelry for which she was not
specifically charged with stealing and which she did not admit to stealing.

At

Ms. Nesbitt’s sentencing hearing, the district court said, “And I don’t care whether it was
three items of jewelry or 30 items of jewelry or $2,000 worth of jewelry or $8,000 worth
of jewelry.” (10/29/15 Tr., p.27, Ls.17-19.) This statement reflects that the State did not
prove, and the district court did not decide, the specific items of jewelry that Ms. Nesbitt
stole from Ms. Buck. The district court erred in ordering Ms. Nesbitt to pay restitution for
crimes which were not adjudicated and were not before the court.
The district court’s restitution order would have been permissible in scope if
Ms. Nesbitt had agreed as part of her plea agreement to pay restitution for loss caused
by crimes which were not adjudicated and were not before the court. Idaho Code § 195304(9) provides that “[t]he court may, with the consent of the parties, order restitution
to victims . . . for economic loss or injury for crimes which are not adjudicated or are not
before the court.” However, it is clear that Ms. Nesbitt did not agree to pay restitution
for such crimes. The pretrial settlement offer reflects that Ms. Nesbitt agreed to “[p]ay
restitution.” (R., p.41.) Prior to accepting Ms. Nesbitt’s guilty plea, the district court
confirmed that Ms. Nesbitt understood she “may be required to pay restitution.”
(9/16/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.4-7.)

Ms. Nesbitt always understood the restitution would be

limited in scope to the items she admitted to pawning for Ms. Buck’s daughter. At
sentencing, Ms. Nesbitt’s counsel explained that Ms. Nesbitt “knows . . . she’ll be on the
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hook for some restitution, and that’s the restitution that we believe the pawned items
would be for . . . .”

(10/29/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-17.)

Counsel for Ms. Nesbitt later

explained that Ms. Nesbitt “is willing to pay for restitution for items she did pawn for
Holly Buck, thinking they were Holly’s items and not Gloria’s.” (10/29/15 Tr., p.23,
Ls.16-20.)
If there is any ambiguity in the scope of the restitution Ms. Nesbitt agreed to pay,
such ambiguity should be resolved in Ms. Nesbitt’s favor and should be limited to the
restitution that is typically provided by statute. See State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 374
(Ct. App. 2007) (discussing the interpretation of ambiguous contractual terms in plea
agreements and noting that, “generally, an agreement to pay restitution in a criminal
case would probably be deemed to refer unambiguously to statutory restitution”); see
also Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 496 (“Ambiguities are construed in favor of the defendant.
Focusing on the defendant’s reasonable understanding also reflects the proper
constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty.”) (quotation marks,
alterations and citations omitted). The restitution that is typically provided by statute is
for economic loss for the crime which is before the court, where the State establishes a
causal connection between the crime and the victim’s loss. See Schultz, 148 Idaho at
886; Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495.

Ms. Nesbitt should have been ordered to pay

restitution only for the items of jewelry she admitted to pawning for Ms. Buck’s daughter.
The district court erred as a matter of law in ordering Ms. Nesbitt to pay restitution for all
of the items Ms. Buck alleged were taken from her.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Determining The Amount Of
Restitution Because The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving Either The Market
Value Or The Replacement Cost Of The Items Of Jewelry Ms. Nesbitt Allegedly Took
From Ms. Buck
The district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the
restitution award because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence regarding
either the market value or the replacement cost of the items of jewelry that Ms. Nesbitt
allegedly took from Ms. Buck. As discussed above, Ms. Nesbitt contends the restitution
award should have been limited in scope to the few items she admitted to pawning for
Ms. Buck’s daughter. The district court could reasonably have awarded restitution for
these items in the amount of $700. Even if this Court disagrees with Ms. Nesbitt and
concludes restitution was proper for all of the items of jewelry that Ms. Buck alleged
were taken from her by Ms. Nesbitt, the district court abused its discretion in valuing
these items at $7,747.80 for purposes of the restitution award. The evidence could
have supported, at most, an award of $5,097.28 for these items.
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) provides in pertinent part that “[u]nless the court
determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall
order a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the
victim to make restitution to the victim.” The statute defines “economic loss” to include
“the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed.”

I.C. § 19-

5304(1)(a). For purposes of restitution, “value” is defined as set forth in the theft statute
to mean “the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such
cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime.” I.C. § 18-2402(11)(a); see also I.C. § 19–5304(1)(c);
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Smith, 144 Idaho at 693. The State has the burden of proving the amount of restitution
by a preponderance of the evidence. See I.C. § 19–5304(6); Nienburg, 153 Idaho at
497-98.
Prior to the restitution hearing, the State filed a restitution form completed by
Ms. Buck, which states that she is “positively sure” that 13 items of jewelry were stolen
from her by Ms. Nesbitt. (R., p.72.) She valued these items at $8,145.00. (R., p.72.)
At the restitution hearing, the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence
either the market value or the replacement cost of the items of jewelry that Ms. Nesbitt
allegedly took from Ms. Buck.

The State presented one witness, Ms. Buck, and

introduced nine exhibits, including five documents titled “Pawned Property Item
Information.”

(11/13/15 Tr., p.4; Exs., pp.1-9.)

The State’s exhibits reflect that

Ms. Nesbitt pawned several items of Ms. Buck’s jewelry to Pounders Jewelry and
Coinsplus.3 It appears that Ms. Nesbitt received $700 in return for two of the items.
(Exs., p.7.) It is not clear how much Ms. Nesbitt received in exchange for the other
items. The only reliable evidence regarding either the market value or the replacement
cost of Ms. Buck’s missing jewelry was the amount Ms. Nesbitt received from her
insurance company, which was intended to compensate her for the loss of all of her
jewelry. The district court abused its discretion in awarding restitution based solely on
Ms. Buck’s testimony about the purchase price of her jewelry.

Ms. Buck testified that two of the documents did not refer to items of jewelry that she
owned. Ms. Buck testified that she did not recognize the item of jewelry referred to in
the State’s second exhibit (an 18 karat white gold diamond and imitation pearl ring).
(Exs., p.2; 11/13/15 Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.12, L.3.) Ms. Buck also testified that the item
referred to in the State’s fourth exhibit (a 1969 yellow gold class ring) was not hers
because her class ring was from 1956. (Exs., p.4; Tr., p.14, Ls.15-23.)

3
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A.

If The Restitution Award Is Limited In Scope To The Items Ms. Nesbitt
Admitted To Pawning For Ms. Buck’s Daughter, The Evidence Would Support An
Award Of $700
Ms. Nesbitt always understood that she would be required to pay restitution for

the few items of jewelry that she admitted to pawning for Ms. Buck’s daughter. The PSI
reflects that Ms. Nesbitt received approximately $700 for these items, and there
appears to be evidence to support this. (PSI, pp.3-4.) The State’s seventh exhibit is a
photocopied image of two rings alongside an image of Ms. Nesbitt’s driver’s license.
(Exs., p.7.) The image includes the date “7/28/2014,” the words “Scrap Gold,” and the
number “700.00.”

(Exs., p.7.)

There was no testimony about the origin of this

photocopied image. Ms. Buck testified that one of the rings displayed in this image “is
probably what I had taken as a Gucci ring” but that she did not recognize the other ring.
(11/13/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-21.) Ms. Buck testified that her Gucci ring was purchased in
Denver in the mid-1980s for $500, and she had no idea about the replacement cost.
(11/13/15 Tr., p.24, L.14 – p.26, L.23.) On her restitution form, Ms. Buck listed an 18
karat gold Gucci pinkie ring, which she valued at $500. (R., p.72.)
If this Court determines as a matter of law that the restitution award should be
limited to the offense for which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted based on her guilty plea, then
it should conclude that the restitution award should have been $700. This is the amount
Ms. Nesbitt stated she received for the items she pawned for Ms. Buck’s daughter, and
is supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
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B.

If The Restitution Award is Not Limited In Scope To The Items Ms. Nesbitt
Admitted To Pawning For Ms. Buck’s Daughter, The Evidence Would Support, At
Most, An Award Of $5,097.28, Which Was The Amount Paid By American Family
Insurance To Ms. Buck To Compensate Her For The Loss, Plus The Deductable
The State introduced evidence regarding additional items of jewelry that

Ms. Buck alleged were taken from her by Ms. Nesbitt, and the State introduced
evidence that Ms. Nesbitt pawned some of these items. However, the State did not
introduce any evidence regarding either the market value or the replacement cost of
these items of jewelry.

The State did, however, introduce evidence that Ms. Buck

received $2,597.28 from her insurance carrier for the theft of her jewelry, and has a
$2,500 deductible. (R., pp.50, 53.) The district court determined that “at a minimum
$5,097.28 is a reasonable starting point for restitution.” (R., p.96.) This should have
been the starting point and the ending point for the restitution award, as there was no
other way to reasonably value the items of jewelry that Ms. Buck claimed to have lost.
The district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the restitution
award, and should have awarded, at most, $5,097.28.
The State introduced, as its first exhibit, a document which reflects that
Ms. Nesbitt pawned a 14 karat yellow gold feather pin4 and a yellow gold ring with a
colored stone cabochon to Pounders Jewelry. (Exs., p.1.) Ms. Buck did not testify about
the value of the feather pin. She testified that the cabachon ring was purchased “in
about the $1,500 range” but said she could not guess at its replacement value.
(11/13/15 Tr,. p.9, L.22-p.10, L.2; p.10, L.21-p.11, L.2.) Ms. Buck listed a 14 karat gold

The exhibit refers to a “feather” and does not state whether it is a ring, a pin, or
something else. (Exs., p.1.) It appears from the PSI that the “feather” referred to in this
exhibit is a feather pin. (See PSI, p.3.)

4
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“lost wax” ring with a ruby cabochon stone on her restitution form, and valued the ring at
$1,500.5 (R., p.72.) Ms. Buck did not list the feather pin on this form. (R., p.72.)
The State also introduced, as its third exhibit, a document which reflects that
Ms. Nesbitt pawned a yellow gold Omega chain to Coinsplus. (Exs., p.3.) Ms. Buck
testified at the restitution hearing that her husband purchased this necklace for
approximately $1,500 at some point prior to 1994. (11/13/15 Tr., p.12, L.25 – p.13, L.4.)
She did not testify about its replacement value. The State introduced as an exhibit a
picture of a similar necklace that Ms. Buck found on the internet with its value redacted.
(Ex. 6; 11/13/15 Tr., p.13, L.8 – p.14, L.12; p.19, Ls.4-6.) On her restitution form,
Ms. Buck listed a 14 karat gold Omega necklace, which she valued at $1,500.
(R., p.72.)
The State introduced, as its fifth exhibit, a document that reflects that Ms. Buck
pawned a “yellow gold cut out band” to Coinsplus. (Exs., p.5.) Ms. Buck testified that
this could be her lion ring, which was purchased at some point prior to 1994 for $150.
(11/13/15 Tr., p.14, L.16 – p.17, L.3.) Ms. Buck testified that, based on her internet
research about gold prices, the lion ring “would be replaced at approximately three
times that value today.” (11/13/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-14.)
The district court ordered Ms. Nesbitt to pay restitution for 12 items of jewelry,
which appears to include 11 of the items on Ms. Buck’s restitution form and one
additional item, the feather pin, which the district court valued at $1,500.00. (Compare
R., p.72 with R., p. 96.) In explaining its award, the district court stated “[t]here is no
competent evidence to support an award that would represent current market value, but

5

The police report states that the “lost wax” ring had a value of $700. (R., p.10.)
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the Court determines that the purchase price of the fine jewelry is sufficient to meet the
State’s burden of proving value by a preponderance of the evidence.” (R., p.97.) The
district court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the award. The only
reliable evidence that the State introduced about the value of all of the missing jewelry
was the insurance award, which was $2,597.28. (R., p.53.) The district court could
have awarded, at most, this amount, plus the deductable ($2,500), for a total award of
$5,097.28. The State did not meet its burden of proving a greater restitution award was
warranted based on a preponderance of the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Nesbitt respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
restitution order and remand for entry of a restitution award of a scope and in an amount
that this Court determines to be appropriate based on the evidence in the record.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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